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Status Processes and Mental Ability 
Test Scores' 
Michael J. Lovaglia and Jeffrey W. Lucas 
University of Iowa 
Jeffrey A. Houser 
Bowling Green State University 
Shane R. Thye 
University of South Carolina 
Barry Markovsky 
University of Iowa 
The expected consequences of a score on an ability test can constrain 
individual performance. The authors predict that status processes, 
including status differences and the differences in rewards and costs 
that result, will produce differences in ability test scores between 
high-status and low-status individuals. In three controlled experi- 
ments, participants randomly assigned low status scored lower on 
a standard test of mental ability (the Raven Progressive Matrices) 
than did participants assigned high status. For both men and 
women, the difference in ability test score between low-status and 
high-status participants was about half a standard deviation. The 
results suggest the need to account for status differences in any at- 
tempt to measure mental ability accurately. 
INTRODUCTION 
Standardized tests of ability determine to a great extent who is admitted 
to elite institutions of higher education and increasingly who is hired and 
promoted in large organizations. Farkas et al. (1997) show that standard- 
ized test scores affect access to valued occupations and wages even when 
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controlling for other factors, such as education and work experience. The 
use of standardized test scores rationalizes the decision process, limiting 
the effect of personal bias on the part of decision makers. Unfortunately, 
reliance on standardized test scores has not equalized opportunities for 
members of disadvantaged social groups. African-Americans, for exam- 
ple, score lower than European-Americans on many tests of mental abil- 
ity, including both college entrance examinations and IQ tests. Thus, use 
of standardized test scores for admissions and hiring decisions effectively 
excludes many disadvantaged group members. Farkas et al. (1997) con- 
clude that to understand racial or ethnic inequalities in earnings, we must 
understand the social origins of group differences in standardized test 
scores. 
We demonstrate how status processes that pervade society can lower 
the scores of disadvantaged group members on a standardized test of men- 
tal ability. We do so by extending well-developed theories of status pro- 
cesses to include performance on standardized tests. Then, we test our 
theory in a controlled, laboratory setting. Before describing the theory and 
its tests, we briefly review research on social structural conditions and 
social processes that affect standardized test scores. 
Nature and Nurture 
The nature of intelligence is a topic of flourishing research and debate. 
The terms "intelligence" or "mental ability" refer to an individual's capac- 
ity to understand complex ideas, to adapt to the environment, to learn, 
to reason, to solve problems, and to overcome obstacles by thinking about 
them (Neisser et al. 1996). A number of theorists have suggested new or 
expanded conceptions of mental ability (e.g., Damasio 1994; Gardner 
1983; Sternberg 1985; Sternberg et al. 1995). However, the psychometric 
approach remains dominant. It uses standardized tests-the Stanford- 
Binet and the Wechsler IQ tests, for example-that presume to measure 
an underlying stable potential for high intellectual performance. For prac- 
tical purposes such as school placement and personnel decisions, intelli- 
gence is a score on a standardized test (Scarr 1997). 
Specifying the social factors that determine individual intelligence re- 
mains a critical unsolved problem in the scientific investigation of intelli- 
gence (Neisser et al. 1996). Ironically, research into the hereditary nature 
of intelligence provides ample evidence that social factors are important. 
The debate over whether heredity or environment is more important in 
the determination of intelligence has produced good empirical research. 
Nonetheless, the debate continues without hope of resolution. 
Studies employing twins or adopted children have been used in at- 
tempts to disentangle the relative contribution to intellectual ability of 
196 
Status Processes 
heredity and environment. A recent, well-designed, large-scale study 
comes down firmly in favor of heredity. The Minnesota study of twins 
reared apart (Bouchard et al. 1990) found that intelligence scores of mono- 
zygotic twins reared apart correlated about .70 while the scores of mono- 
zygotic twins reared together correlated about .80. That is, twins who 
lived apart in different environments were almost as similar in intelligence 
as twins who shared the same environment from birth. However, twin 
studies are not controlled experiments. A number of other factors could 
be responsible for the similarity between twins reared apart and twins 
reared together (Eysenk and Kamin 1980). 
Adoption studies also support both nature and nurture. One startling 
conclusion drawn from these studies is that adopted children raised in 
the same family may be about as different from one another as children 
randomly selected from the population (Plomin and Daniels 1987). How- 
ever, other studies compare the IQs of children living in deprived settings 
with the IQs of children adopted from deprived settings into more affluent 
homes. These studies generally report increased IQ for children placed in 
enriched settings and little evidence for IQ heritability (Schiff et al. 1978). 
In sum, evidence from twin and adoption studies supports the conclusion 
that both genetics and social factors play roles in determining individual 
intellectual ability. 
For our purposes, it is sufficient to note the large role of environment 
in determining intellectual ability. Proponents of genetic determinism in- 
terpret he results of the Minnesota twin study (Bouchard et al. 1990) to 
mean that heredity is responsible for at most 70% of differences in intellec- 
tual ability. The environment, hen, would account for at least 30%. The 
debate continues over the proper contribution of heredity and environ- 
ment implied by these percentages. Other recent studies estimate a smaller 
role for heredity, a contribution of about 50% of the variation in IQ scores, 
suggesting a larger role for social factors (Chipuer, Rovine, and Plomin 
1990; Devlin, Daniels, and Roeder 1997; Loehlin 1989; Rodgers, Rowe, 
and May 1994; Scarr and Weinberg 1978; Scarr, Weinberg, and Waldman 
1993). If both heredity and environment make important contributions to 
individual intelligence, then the proportion that each contributes is not 
as important as identifying how those contributions are made. 
The potential for cultural bias in standardized tests has been a major 
concern for several decades. Some standardized test items may be easier 
for privileged members of society to answer than for the less privileged. 
Whereas tests based on verbal and mathematical ability cannot be com- 
pletely culture free, it is more difficult o make a case for cultural bias 
in nonverbal tests of abstract reasoning such as the Raven Progressive 
Matrices. Despite years of trying to eliminate cultural bias from standard- 
ized tests and increased education for African-Americans, they still score 
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lower than European-Americans on standardized tests-including IQ 
and scholastic aptitude tests. The difference remains substantial, around 
three-quarters of a standard deviation for IQ (10-12 IQ points) and two- 
thirds of a standard deviation for scholastic aptitude tests (Herrnstein and 
Murray 1994). The gap persists despite attempts to statistically control 
socioeconomic status and other social factors (Herrnstein and Murray 
1994; Jensen 1992). If social factors are responsible for differences in test 
scores between social groups, then it is incumbent upon social scientists 
to identify those factors and demonstrate their impact on standardized 
test scores. 
Moreover, differences in intellectual ability between groups may result 
from social factors even if individual differences in intelligence are largely 
inherited. The variation in test scores among individuals is in general 
much higher than the variation in scores between groups (Jensen 1980). 
For example, Neisser et al. (1996) found little evidence for genetic differ- 
ences in intelligence between races. When social factors uch as socioeco- 
nomic status are controlled, however, a substantial difference remains be- 
tween ability test scores of African-Americans and European-Americans. 
Perhaps because specific social factors have not been demonstrated to pro- 
duce substantial differences in ability test scores, the controversy contin- 
ues over a genetic explanation for the difference between African-Ameri- 
cans and European-Americans. 
Environmental Correlates of Ability Test Scores 
Most of the research on social factors that could account for differences 
in ability test scores is correlational. Relatively little research has focused 
on social processes that could explain how social factors could produce 
test score differences. This section looks at social factors found to correlate 
with ability test scores. The following sections focus on social processes 
that could produce differences in test scores. 
Some environmental factors have direct biological effects that are rea- 
sonably well understood. For example, poor nutrition during child devel- 
opment, environmental lead, and prenatal exposure to alcohol can all 
lower IQ scores (Pollitt et al. 1993, Needleman; Geiger and Frank 1985; 
Streissguth, Barr, and Sampson 1990). Factors such as nutrition, lead ex- 
posure, and prenatal alcohol exposure have direct biological effects on 
brain development hat suggest an approach to improve social conditions: 
providing adequate nutrition or removing harmful agents from a child's 
environment eliminates the risk of low IQ from these causes. 
Social factors that correlate with test scores often provide little insight 
into the process by which a social category influences individual test 
scores. For example, if racial differences in ability test scores are not due to 
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genetics (and there is no reason to believe they are), then why do African- 
Americans score lower than European-Americans? Socioeconomic status 
(SES) offers a partial explanation. African-Americans have disproportion- 
ately low SES, and low SES individuals do score lower on ability tests. 
The correlation between SES and IQ is about .4 (White 1982). However, 
test score differences between African-Americans and European-Ameri- 
cans remain when individuals of similar SES are compared (Loehlin, Lin- 
dzey, and Spuhler 1975). 
Identifying social factors correlated with ability test scores also leaves 
open the question of causal mechanism. For example, one way that SES 
might alter test scores is that children from higher income families grow 
up in an enriched intellectual environment. Rodgers et al. (1994) found 
some evidence for the benefit of an enriched home environment in general 
and more specifically for the number of books owned by a child. However, 
the magnitude of the effect was neither large nor consistent across various 
ability test scores (Rodgers et al. 1994). Further, it is as easy to argue that 
high IQ leads to the acquisition of books as that acquiring books improves 
IQ. 
It might help to look for the social processes that lead to differences in 
ability test scores rather than to differences in ability. Recall that, for prac- 
tical purposes, mental ability is a score on a test. Ability is one determinant 
of an individual's score on an ability test. There are others. For example, 
Milofsky (1989) found that, in a suburban, predominately white, school 
district, psychologists pent twice as much time testing each student as 
did psychologists in an urban, predominately black, school district. Thus, 
even if individual psychologists treat African-American and European- 
American students identically, individual African-Americans have less 
time to complete the test and get less attention from testers. One way, 
then, that social factors uch as race and SES can affect ability test scores 
is through the way tests are administered. 
Expectancy Effects, Self-Esteem, and Self-Efficacy 
Teachers' expectations affect heir students' performance. Students try to 
fulfill their teachers' expectations and teachers' expectations bias evalua- 
tions of student performance. Pygmalion is the classic literary example of 
the process. Professor Henry Higgins's expectations for Eliza Doolittle 
transform her. A self-fulfilling prophecy operates whereby members of 
some groups are expected to be more competent han others, and the ex- 
pectancy creates conditions that produce the expected result (Merton 
1948). 
In Rosenthal and Jacobson's ([1968] 1992) original study of the Pygmal- 
ion effect in the classroom, researchers led teachers to believe that some 
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of their students were likely to "bloom" intellectually during the coming 
school year. At the end of the school year, those students whom teachers 
expected to show greater intellectual improvement did show significantly 
greater gains on a mental ability test than did "nonbloomers." Surpris- 
ingly, researchers also found that teachers judged "nonblooming" students 
unfavorably when they scored higher than expected. Rosenthal (1994) 
concluded that there are hazards to unexpected intellectual growth, an 
idea we will use later to develop our theory. 
Despite the hundreds of studies that have reported expectancy effects 
in various social situations (Rosenthal and Rubin 1978), controversy over 
the importance of expectancy effects continues. The size of the effect re- 
mains unknown even among proponents (Rosenthal 1994). In addition, 
there is substantial opposition to the claim that teacher expectancies can 
influence learner intelligence. Snow (1995) reanalyzed the Pygmalion data 
and found only very small effects of expectancies on mental ability. He 
also points to the voluminous literature showing that mental abilities are 
not easily changed. 
The expectations that individuals have for their own performance may 
also affect scores on mental ability tests. Social disadvantage could lead 
to lower ability test scores by adversely affecting self-esteem or self-effi- 
cacy. Self-esteem and especially self-efficacy are thought o improve per- 
formance by increasing the persistence with which individuals approach 
tasks and by reducing anxiety about possible failure (Bandura 1986). 
However, researchers have found no effect of self-esteem on achievement 
test scores (Maruyama, Rubin, and Kingsbury 1981) and only small self- 
efficacy effects on standardized test scores in a few studies (Multon, 
Brown, and Lent 1991). 
The following sections develop and test a new theory that proposes a 
different social process to explain differences in ability test scores. Individ- 
uals in advantaged and disadvantaged groups hold different expectations 
about the personal consequences of an ability test score. Expectations 
about the personal consequences of a test score, rather than expectations 
about personal ability, may explain differences in ability test scores be- 
tween social groups. 
Status Processes and Rational Choice 
We extend status characteristics theory to explain the difference in intelli- 
gence scores between advantaged and disadvantaged groups in society. 
Two elements of the status process work to the advantage of high-status 
individuals and the disadvantage of low-status individuals who take men- 
tal ability tests. First, previous social interaction as a high- or low-status 
individual may produce different expectations for performance on the test. 
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Group Membership | 
Self-Efficacy _______ 
4+ | Expectationss 
+ Rewards and Costs 
\+\ 
Test Score Performnance 
FIG. 1.-The status process 
High-status individuals are evaluated more highly for their performances 
than are low-status individuals. Thus, in test situations, high-status indi- 
viduals may have higher self-efficacy than low-status individuals. Second, 
according to status characteristics theory, status processes produce a social 
structure that provides rewards based on status. Those with high status 
come to expect high rewards for a competent performance. Those with 
low status expect not only low rewards but may anticipate punishment 
for competent performance that challenges the group's status hierarchy. 
Thus in some situations, it is in the interest of low-status individuals to 
underperform. Taking a standardized test may be one of those situations. 
A rational low-status individual may score lower on a standardized test 
rather than be penalized for a higher score. 
The social process that produces status differences results in higher re- 
wards and lower costs for identical performances depending on an indi- 
vidual's status (see fig. 1). Given different rewards and costs for identical 
performances, a rational choice perspective would suggest that increased 
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rewards and decreased costs would motivate a rational actor to do better 
when rewarded highly and worse when punished for a performance. We 
briefly introduce status characteristics theory, extend its scope to apply to 
individual performance on standardized tests, then show how the differ- 
ential rewards and costs that result from the status process can further 
separate the IQ scores of high-status and low-status actors. 
Status Characteristics Theory and Individual Performance 
Status refers to an individual's standing in the hierarchy of a group based 
on the prestige, honor, and deference accorded her by other members. 
Status characteristics are features of individuals that influence group 
members' beliefs about each other. Different "states" of a status character- 
istic are assumed to have differential value, esteem, and honor. For exam- 
ple, in the United States, European-Americans are privileged over Afri- 
can-Americans. Race is a diffuse status characteristic because it carries 
with it expectations for competence in a wide variety of situations. Status 
characteristics can also be as specific as grade point average in high school 
or the score on a standardized test. Status characteristics help determine 
group members' relative status by altering expectations for competence 
that members hold for one another. 
Status characteristics produce status rank through a chain of four logi- 
cally connected assumptions (Webster and Foschi 1988): 
1. A status characteristic becomes salient in a task situation if it differ- 
entiates among group members or is directly related to the task. 
2. Salient status characteristics, even if not directly related to the task, 
will become relevant unless they are specifically dissociated from the 
task. 
3. The effects of relevant status characteristics combine to form an ag- 
gregated performance xpectation for each member. 
4. Status rank is a direct function of the aggregated performance expec- 
tations of group members: The higher the aggregated performance 
expectation for a member, the higher is that member's status rank 
in the group. 
The scope of status characteristics theory is confined to task-oriented 
groups where the contributions of all members are needed to accomplish 
some task. That is, status characteristics theory applies to groups where 
members are collectively oriented and task oriented. In groups meeting 
its scope conditions, the theory states that a status hierarchy will form 
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consistent with statuses that members possess in society at large.2 High- 
status members (1) are given more opportunities to perform, (2) perform 
more often, (3) are given higher evaluations for their performances, and 
(4) have more influence over group decisions than do low-status members 
(Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980). Thus, status processes produce 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Expectations for competence determine status 
rank, and high-status members are evaluated as more competent because 
they have high status. High evaluations lead in turn to higher rewards 
for high-status individuals (Berger, Fi?ek, et al. 1985). 
Status characteristics theory also explains why low-status group mem- 
bers may be penalized for demonstrating they are more competent han 
their low status would suggest. Recall that teachers judged students unfa- 
vorably when the students violated teachers' expectations by performing 
at a higher level (Rosenthal 1994). Performance by high-status and low- 
status group members is perceived differently. While high-status individ- 
uals are given high evaluations for their performances, performances by 
low-status individuals are devalued and ignored despite their objective 
merit. Thus, while some low-status members may have very high ability, 
status hierarchies based on expectations for group members' ability are 
maintained as stable social structures. Very competent performances by 
low-status individuals do not produce comparable increases in expecta- 
tions of their ability. Instead, unexpectedly competent performances by 
low-status individuals are seen as illegitimate (Ridgeway 1988; Ridgeway 
and Berger 1986, 1988) and subject to negative sanctions (Berger et al. 
1998). Also, Ridgeway (1978) proposed and later demonstrated (Ridgeway 
1981, 1982; replicated by Shackelford, Wood, and Worchel [1996]) that 
contributions of low-status group members are perceived to be selfishly 
motivated, while contributions of high-status group members are assumed 
to be group motivated. A high score on an ability test might well be nega- 
tively sanctioned if it were perceived as an illegitimate and selfish attempt 
to grab status. An expression used in the southeastern United States suc- 
cinctly captures how group members feel about a competent performance 
by a low-status group member: Overachievement by those of low status is 
considered uppity and, therefore, subject to a number of social sanctions. 
A story told by John Lamont, a successful African-American physicist, 
illustrates how displays of competence by low-status individuals can be 
sanctioned (Benjamin 1991). Lamont's father was a self-taught aeronauti- 
2 We present only those parts of status characteristics theory necessary to our argu- 
ment. For more thorough exposition see Berger, Fi?ek, Norman, and Zelditch (1977), 
Markovsky, Smith, and Berger (1984), Webster and Foschi (1988), Berger, Fi?ek, and 
Norman (1989), or Berger, Norman, Balkwell, and Smith (1992). 
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cal engineer who invented a number of devices for use on airplanes during 
the 1930s and 1940s. However, given the prevailing racial climate, he 
supported his family working as a janitor at a gas company in Washing- 
ton, D.C. When job opportunities opened up after the Depression, he de- 
cided to try for a better job. He told the foreman he would like to be a 
machinist. The foreman was skeptical of his ability to operate the ma- 
chines. So Lamont's father demonstrated his ability as a skilled craftsman 
by operating the machines easily. His display of competence nraged the 
foreman who fired him on the spot from his job as a janitor. 
Extending the Scope of Status Characteristics Theory 
Status characteristics theory explains how group members expect superior 
performance from high-status members and evaluate their performance 
as superior even when performances by high- and low-status members 
are identical. However, the theory has not been used to predict the objec- 
tive level of group members' performances. In particular, status effects 
on individual performance on standardized tests have been ruled out be- 
cause such situations lack collective orientation and thus fall outside the 
scope of the theory. That is, because individual performance on standard- 
ized tests is independent of the contributions of other group members, the 
theory cannot predict that status information will alter the performance 
of test takers. To use the theory to predict differences in ability test scores, 
we must show how it can apply to individual performances. 
Ridgeway and Walker (1995) note that status processes have been ob- 
served to constrain individual performances independent of actual ability. 
Hints of a role for status processes in performance on ability tests can be 
found in the research literature. Elizabeth Cohen and her colleagues have 
designed school programs to integrate students of diverse backgrounds in 
a cohesive classroom (Cohen 1986, 1993; Cohen, Lotan, and Leechor 
1989). They succeed by carefully controlling status processes and by 
breaking down existing status distinctions (Cohen and Roper 1972, 1985; 
Rosenholtz 1985; Rosenholtz and Cohen 1985). An interesting by-product 
of the program is improved performance on standardized achievement 
tests for all students but especially for lower-status tudents (Cohen et al. 
1989). 
IQ gains made by children adopted into enriched environments have 
been found to fade by early adulthood (Scarr and Weinberg 1978). This 
has been seen as evidence of the genetic basis for intelligence (Herrnstein 
and Murray 1994). However, it also is possible that the IQ gains of young 
adoptees fade because status processes in school and work situations be- 
come more important as children age and counter the effects of an en- 
riched home environment. 
204 
Status Processes 
Steele and Aronson (1995) gave African-American and European- 
American students a test composed of items from the verbal portion of 
the Graduate Record Exam. In one condition, students were told the test 
measured their verbal ability. In another condition, students were told 
the test merely was a means of familiarizing them with verbal problems 
they might encounter. European-American students did equally well on 
the test in both conditions. In contrast, African-American students did 
worse when told the test measured their ability. This suggests that the 
status of African-Americans plays a role in their performance on standard- 
ized tests: their scores may drop when they know the results can be used 
to compare their performance with that of European-Americans. Our goal 
is to explain the mechanism behind such stereotype vulnerability. 
We propose that status processes constrain individual performances 
when those performances are expected to have an impact on the relative 
status of the performer in the future (Lovaglia and Lucas 1997). Status 
makes a difference on an individual performance when the results of the 
performance have status value, that is, when the performance is expected 
to be used to determine status rank in future group interaction. According 
to status characteristics theory, status rank is a direct function of the ag- 
gregated expectations of group members for each other's competent per- 
formance on collective tasks. Those expectations are determined in part by 
individual performances. For example, achievement test scores produce 
general expectations of competence. We expect a person who scored 1600 
on her combined math and verbal Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) be- 
fore entering college to be able to contribute more than a person who 
scored 750. Standardized test scores have a significant impact on the fu- 
ture academic and work careers of Americans. Thus, we propose that 
status processes will affect ability test scores in the United States. There 
are several ways this could occur. 
Individuals' expectations for performance on a test could affect their 
performance directly. Here the mechanism suggested by status character- 
istics theory is similar to that proposed by self-efficacy research. Individu- 
als who perceive themselves to be more capable of success on a test will 
persevere in trying to solve problems and experience less fear of failure. 
There is a major difference between status characteristics theory and self- 
efficacy with regard to expectations of competence. Self-efficacy has to do 
with beliefs or conceptions about personal capability. The implication is 
that perceptions of self-efficacy are consciously held. In contrast, status 
characteristics theory makes no assumption that expectations of compe- 
tence are consciously held. Individuals may or may not be aware that they 
expect more competent performances from those with high status (Berger, 
Wagner, and Zelditch 1985). Still, the advantages accruing to high-status 
individuals on ability tests from increased perseverance and reduced anxi- 
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ety would probably produce only a small effect. We would not expect any 
greater effect for expectations of ability than the small effect of self-effi- 
cacy found by Multon et al. (1991). 
William Foote Whyte ([1943] 1981) documented other ways that status 
processes affect individual performance in his classic Street Corner Soci- 
ety. Low-status gang members rarely beat gang leaders at bowling even 
when low-status members had superior bowling ability. If by chance a 
low-status member did beat one of the leaders, the low-status member 
could be taunted, ridiculed, and talked into losing a return match. This 
reaffirmed the status hierarchy of the group. An individual's bowling 
score is not dependent on a collective process and so would fall outside 
the scope of status characteristics theory, yet status processes seem to oper- 
ate. It could be argued that there is a collective metatask-the task of 
maintaining the status hierarchy. A goal of bowling may be maintenance 
of status hierarchies, just as a goal of ability testing is the maintenance 
of status hierarchies. Thus, the same processes that affected bowling 
scores could affect scores on standardized tests. Low-status members un- 
derperformed at bowling because of the consequences of bowling well. In 
society, there also may be negative consequences for low-status individu- 
als who do well on standardized tests. 
Rational Choice 
Individuals occupying different status ranks may come to expect quite 
different outcomes from the same performance on an objective, standard- 
ized test. These expectations may then affect how an individual performs 
on such a test. From a rational choice perspective, if people expect to 
receive large rewards for success on a test, they may do better on the test 
than they would if they expected a smaller reward. For example, some 
might expect a good score on the SAT test to lead eventually to a position 
as a prominent doctor or lawyer. But others, coming from different back- 
grounds, might expect a more modest reward, a steady job with the post 
office or as a teacher. 
Members of different groups also may expect different costs to result 
from a score on an ability test. If people expect to pay substantial costs 
for success on a test, they may do worse than they would if they expected 
costs to be trivial. For some the costs of success might be trivial. A high 
score and going off to college entail little disruption in the life of the son 
or daughter of a doctor. Others may expect much higher costs. For exam- 
ple, a minority student who does well on a test and plans to go to college 
might be shunned by peers for trying to be "too white" (Fordham and 
Ogbu 1986; Steinberg, Dornbusch, and Brown 1992). African-Americans 
are particularly concerned about the costs of academic success. Arroyo 
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and Zigler (1995) showed that, for African-Americans, attitudes conducive 
to high academic achievement were associated with introjective depres- 
sion and especially with concerns about losing the approval of others. 
Moreover, going away to college involves immersion in an alien culture, 
cut off from social support (Morris 1979; Blackwell 1981; Fleming 1981; 
Fordham 1988). 
There also is evidence that teachers penalize low-status individuals for 
scoring higher on tests than teachers think they should. The original Pyg- 
malion study found that intellectual ability is penalized when it violates 
expectations (Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968). If members of a disadvan- 
taged group are expected to possess lower mental ability, then disadvan- 
taged individuals who do well on ability tests face increased criticism. 
Rubovits and Maehr (1973) conducted a follow-up to the Pygmalion study 
that compared teachers' reactions to African-American and European- 
American students. African-American students thought to be "gifted" 
were criticized the most and given the least attention. European-American 
students thought o be "gifted" were praised the most and given the most 
attention. African-American students thought o be nongifted received al- 
most as much praise and attention as did European-American students 
thought to be nongifted. Rosenthal's (1994) conclusion that a penalty is 
imposed on those who show unexpected intellectual ability holds true for 
race. African-Americans with high IQ scores were criticized more and 
praised less than other students, both black and white. That is, African- 
Americans were penalized for high scores on a standardized test. 
We conclude from the above evidence that African-Americans ot only 
expect to be penalized for a high score on standardized tests but actually 
do bear a cost for success. Fordham and Ogbu (1986) suggest that African- 
Americans grow up with a double message about intellectual achieve- 
ment: (1) work twice as hard to get half as far, and (2) keep your head 
down, do not stand out. As a result, African-Americans experience ambiv- 
alence and dissonance toward intellectual effort and success (Fordham 
and Ogbu 1986). Thus, underperformance on an ability test represents an 
adaptive response by African-Americans. Getting a low score on a test 
would be a reasonable way to avoid those costs. However, it is possible, 
even likely, that low-status individuals would work as hard as anyone 
when taking an ability test. We propose that people taking an ability test 
try hard to get the best score possible without incurring an unacceptable 
cost. In the face of a possible severe penalty for success, low-status individ- 
uals should be extremely motivated to get just the right mediocre score. 
Because the expected consequences of ability test scores have implica- 
tions for status hierarchy formation, we propose an extension to status 
characteristics theory that allows its application to individual perfor- 
mances. If the extension proves valid, then an individual's rank in the 
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status hierarchy and the resulting rewards and costs associated with suc- 
cess on achievement ests may affect scores on such tests. We tested the 
following hypothesis for situations in which differences in an ability test 
score have implications for future work in a task group: 
HYPOTHESIS. If the performance expectations and reward expecta- 
tions of ability test takers correspond to their status, then their perfor- 
mance is a positive function of their status. 
METHOD 
We used an experimental approach to test our theory that the expected 
consequences of a score on an ability test partially determine the score 
that an individual receives. Researchers have recently pointed to the need 
for social research to control possible genetic or biological influences on 
social phenomena (Scarr 1997; Udry 1995). Eysenck (1995) and Turk- 
heimer (1991) argue that the experimental investigation of differences in 
intelligence is now not only needed but possible. Experiments provide 
strong evidence for the causal direction of a relationship between two 
variables. We use laboratory experiments to investigate whether a funda- 
mental social process-status hierarchy formation and maintenance-can 
produce differences in ability test scores. Experimental control allows us 
to pinpoint the cause of any test score differences we find and rule out 
competing genetic or biological explanations. 
Along with its strengths, the experimental approach has disadvantages, 
as do all research designs. For maximum effectiveness, the experimental 
approach dictates, for example, that research participants are assigned 
randomly to the conditions thought to produce an effect. By randomly 
assigning participants to conditions, we obtain strong evidence that those 
conditions, and not something else, produced any observed differences in 
test scores. We can screen out extraneous ystematic differences between 
experimental groups, while statistically controlling random differences. 
The disadvantage is that the kinds of conditions we can create in the 
laboratory are limited. For example, it is not possible to assign participants 
to a race randomly. It is not feasible to assign participants to any major 
social category associated with differences in ability test scores. We cannot 
randomly assign participants to different religions, to wealth or poverty, 
to different home environments. The problem of alternative plausible ex- 
planations that plagues other research methods is present in experiments 
where participants cannot be randomly assigned to conditions. For exam- 
ple, we could administer a standardized test to carefully matched African- 
American and European-American students. The results would likely 
show that African-American students cored lower, but we would not be 
any closer to finding out why. To effectively investigate the social process 
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that produces differences in ability test scores, we must assign participants 
randomly to either high-status or low-status conditions. 
In a laboratory, we can create status differences that have social conse- 
quences. We can create conditions where high-status participants expect 
higher rewards and lower costs than low-status participants for a high 
score on an ability test. Once created, we can assign participants randomly 
to those conditions. Then we can administer a standardized test of mental 
ability and look for differences in test scores between conditions. That is, 
we can model the social process theorized to produce differences in ability 
test scores. If we find theoretically predicted differences, then we have 
strong evidence that the social process being modeled does produce differ- 
ences in ability test scores. 
The logic of experimental design is indirect. Results of experiments do 
not generalize to naturally occurring situations the way that survey ques- 
tionnaire results do (Zelditch 1980). For example, surveys conducted be- 
fore elections predict more or less accurately who will win the election. 
We know how accurate those surveys will be. The more representative 
of the population of voters is the sample used in the survey, the more 
accurate the results will be. Experiments do not work that way at all. 
It seems reasonable to ask, How can an experiment on white university 
undergraduates tell us anything about racial differences in test scores? 
The logic of the experimental approach is commonly understood in 
other fields of research. Most of us are familiar with its application to 
medical research. For example, medical researchers cannot randomly as- 
sign people to be exposed to suspected cancer-causing agents, then wait 
to see who gets cancer. They use laboratory animals instead. Researchers 
paint tobacco tar on the skin of randomly selected mice, while randomly 
selecting other mice as controls. They then wait to see if mice painted 
with tobacco tar get cancer more often than do the control mice who were 
not exposed. When the painted mice get cancer much more often than the 
control mice, researchers are confident hat the tobacco tar caused the 
cancer. The study is replicated under different conditions with different 
animals to investigate the process by which tobacco tar produces cancer. 
For example, dogs can be taught to smoke cigarettes and the cancer rates 
of smoking and nonsmoking dogs compared. However, as has often been 
said by executives of tobacco companies and their lawyers, studies on 
laboratory animals do not prove that smoking tobacco causes cancer in 
humans. 
While laboratory studies have not proved that smoking tobacco causes 
cancer in humans, they have shed light on the physiological process that 
does. If the same physiological processes take place in humans and in 
particular laboratory animals, and if those processes have been shown to 
produce cancer in those animals, then we have reason to suspect that 
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cancer will result in humans as well. Added to the evidence of laboratory 
studies is the correlational evidence from human populations. People who 
smoke cigarettes get cancer at a much higher rate than nonsmokers do. 
Smokers who quit smoking for a number of years have a reduced chance 
of getting cancer. It is true that smoking tobacco has not been proved to 
cause cancer in humans. However, few people think that smoking is safe. 
The evidence linking smoking to cancer is overwhelming. 
Laboratory studies of social phenomena employ the same logic. Experi- 
ments are best used to test theories of social processes (Mook 1983; Zel- 
ditch 1980). Experimental evidence is then used to develop better theories 
in a research program. In research programs, the relationship between 
theory and empirical investigation is reciprocal. Empirical research both 
tests theory and prompts theoretical development hat then requires fur- 
ther tests. Research programs facilitate the cumulative growth of knowl- 
edge (Wagner and Berger 1985, 1986, 1993; Szmatka and Lovaglia 1996). 
We feel we understand a social process when the theory explaining it has 
been supported by many experimental tests of various aspects of the pro- 
cess. Then, when we understand an underlying social process, we gain 
confidence that theoretically derived predictions will hold in diverse situa- 
tions that conform to the conditions pecified by the theory (Webster and 
Kervin 1971). 
We apply the logic of the. experimental approach to the study of differ- 
ences in ability test scores between groups. To do so we extended a well- 
tested theory of an underlying social process. Status characteristics theory 
explains how the process of status hierarchy formation operates to pro- 
duce different ability test scores for high-status and low-status individu- 
als. The theory has been supported by hundreds of tests of its various 
aspects.3 We designed experiments to test the specific prediction that sta- 
tus processes can produce differences in ability test scores for high-status 
and low-status individuals. If the experiments find higher ability test 
scores for high-status than for low-status individuals, then we will gain 
confidence that we understand how status processes produce different 
ability test scores for advantaged and disadvantaged groups. 
There is ample evidence that race operates as a status characteristic 
(Cohen and Roper 1972; Webster and Driskell 1978). Thus, if racial differ- 
' See Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch (1985) for a review of the first 20 years of status 
characteristics and expectation states research. Berger et al. (1992) review more recent 
work and describe an extensive test. Cohen and Zhou (1991) found status characteris- 
tics to influence behavior in research and development eams that had existed for 
years in organizations. Recent theoretical developments relating status processes to 
other areas of social research ave also been supported in experimental tests (Lovaglia 
and Houser 1996; Biernat and Kobrynowicz 1997; Troyer and Younts 1997; Willer, 
Lovaglia, and Markovsky 1997). 
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ences in society are characterized by the conditions pecified by the theory 
to produce differences in ability test scores, then we will gain confidence 
that we understand how status processes produce racial differences in 
ability test scores. The theory specifies three general conditions for its ap- 
plication to racial differences in ability test scores: if (1) racial differences 
are such that African-Americans are expected to be less competent in a 
variety of work settings than are European-Americans, and (2) test scores 
have status consequences for future work in groups, and (3) African- 
Americans expect lower rewards and higher costs to result from success 
on tests of mental ability, then the theory proposes that status processes 
will produce test score differences between racial groups. 
DESIGN 
We created status differences in the laboratory and randomly assigned 
participants to either a high-status or low-status condition. Then we ad- 
ministered a standard test of mental ability to all participants. Differences 
in test scores between the high-status and low-status conditions represent 
strong evidence that status differences produced differences in test scores. 
We also collected data from participants for several relevant variables 
that can act as statistical controls. 
The creation of status differences in the laboratory is the key to the 
experimental demonstration of the effect of status differences on ability 
test scores. Studies of naturally occurring status distinctions uch as race 
inevitably confound social and hereditary causes. Steele and Aronson 
(1995) conducted experiments that show how test scores of African-Ameri- 
cans but not European-Americans are adversely affected by expected 
comparison with national norms. Thus, African-Americans are vulnerable 
to their social position, scoring lower when their scores could affect heir 
social relations. Racial vulnerability appears to be a purely social effect, 
produced by test conditions in the laboratory. Randomly selected African- 
Americans in the comparison condition had lower scores than African- 
Americans in the no-comparison condition. However, even controlled lab- 
oratory experiments on race allow alternative explanations. The source 
of African-American vulnerability has yet to be determined. Would other 
students be as vulnerable in circumstances imilar to those faced by Afri- 
can-Americans? Again we run into the random assignment problem. We 
cannot tell whether European-American students would respond similarly 
given similar experiences because we cannot randomly assign race. 
Creating a Status Characteristic 
To investigate whether status processes produce differences in ability test 
scores and to rule out alternative xplanations, we created a status charac- 
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teristic in the laboratory as proposed by Ridgeway (1991; Ridgeway et al. 
1995). We started with a status-neutral characteristic, handedness, that 
we felt would be an integral part of participants' identities. Because men- 
tal ability is a stable trait that has been reported to resist attempts to 
change it, we wanted to create a strong status effect. We felt that the 
status effect would be enhanced if participants identified with the charac- 
teristic, if the characteristic, like handedness, was part of them. We first 
established that handedness was a status-neutral characteristic. Survey 
responses from 384 undergraduates in the subject population showed no 
differences in expectations for the competence of left- and right-handed 
persons.4 We then set out to imbue a person's handedness with status 
value. 
When students arrived for the study, they were asked if they were right- 
or left-handed, and a brightly colored wrist band was placed on the pre- 
ferred wrist. (Handedness was later confirmed by a series of computerized 
questions.) Students were told they would be working in a group to solve 
difficult problems that required intense cooperation among group mem- 
bers. Computerized instructions informed students in one condition that 
research showed right-handedness to predict high ability in the kind of 
group work to be performed, while left-handedness predicted low ability.5 
Right-handedness was further associated with several positive personal 
traits, while left-handedness was associated with several negative traits. 
The instructions explained that research has shown right-handers to be 
better in the kinds of group work to be done and that "certain psychologi- 
cal processes having to do with the left and right brain are thought to 
cause this effect." Students were told that research had shown left- hand- 
ers to be more impulsive, disorganized, and prone to inattention. Further, 
students were told that research had shown some positive traits of left- 
handers, such as creativity, could increase the resentment of those who 
worked under them.6 In another condition, left handedness was associated 
with high ability and characterized positively, while right-handedness was 
associated with low ability and characterized negatively. Thus, students 
'The analyses are available on request from Michael Lovaglia. 
5The program to run the experimental setting is available from Michael Lovaglia on 
request. 
6 We checked during debriefing to see whether the information on handedness was 
plausible. In only a few cases did students ay they were suspicious to the point that 
they did not try their best on the ability test. Data for these students were removed 
before analysis. Much more common was the reaction by low-status individuals dur- 
ing debriefing who said they knew they were being discriminated against and tried 
harder on the test to prove discrimination would have no effect on them. These stu- 
dents generally scored below average on the test. 
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could be randomly assigned to a condition in which their handedness cre- 
ated expectations of either high or low status in the upcoming work with 
their group. 
Altering Expectations of Rewards and Costs 
We also wanted students to expect different rewards and costs to result 
from the status we assigned them. To do so, we set up three levels of 
occupational status, each with a different pay level, in their work groups: 
Supervisors were to be paid $17 per hour; analysts, $8; and menials, $4.50. 
Students were informed of two criteria for assigning them to an occupa- 
tion, both of which were purported to predict success at the task: (1) their 
status as a right- or left-hander and (2) their score on an aptitude test. 
High-status individuals who scored high on the aptitude test would be 
supervisors. High-status individuals who scored low on the test and low- 
status individuals who scored high on the test would be analysts. Low- 
status individuals who scored low on the test would be menials.7 Thus, 
while all students had a monetary incentive to do well on the test, the 
incentive was greater for high-status tudents. 
On the cost side, students were told that low-status individuals were 
seldom appointed supervisor because of the conflict that sometimes 
erupted between low-status supervisors and other group members. They 
were told that low-status analysts were also harassed but not as severely. 
They were warned not to harass low-status group members. Further, stu- 
dents were warned against cheating and told that cheaters were often 
caught when low-status individuals scored abnormally high on the test. 
Thus, low-status students expected costs to result from a high score on 
the test while high-status tudents did not expect those costs. 
In sum, students assigned high status expected higher rewards and 
lower costs to result from a high score on an aptitude test.8 We could then 
administer a standard ability test to determine whether students assigned 
high status would score higher than students assigned low status. 
7It can be argued that similar discrimination against African-Americans is effectively 
outlawed now in the United States. However, we propose that lower test scores result 
from the expectations of low-status individuals for lower rewards and higher costs. 
Thus the expectations of individuals, not the legality of discrimination, is the issue. 
We predict race, as a status characteristic, toproduce differences intest scores to the 
extent hat African-Americans expect lower rewards and higher costs to result from 
a high score. 
8 We used several kinds of rewards and costs because we were unsure of our ability 
to produce a significant difference in ability test scores after a brief and relatively 
mild laboratory manipulation. 
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Raven Progressive Matrices Test 
We chose to administer the Raven Progressive Matrices test to students 
for several reasons. First, it has been an accepted test of mental ability 
for many years (see Raven, Court, and Raven [1992] for a summary of 
standardization research as well as tests of reliability and validity). Sec- 
ond, Raven scores correlate highly with other measures of general mental 
ability and are considered closely related to Spearman's g, or general intel- 
ligence (Jensen 1992). Third, no reading is required, which makes the Ra- 
ven less culture bound than some other tests of mental ability. Fourth, 
because it involves deciphering patterns, students' a priori expectations 
for their performance on verbal and quantitative problems would be less 
salient than on a scholastic aptitude test. Fifth, it is self-administered, and 
thus scores are not as subject to the bias of test givers as is the case for 
some intelligence tests. 
Students were seated at computer terminals in individual lab rooms for 
the experiments. After approximately 15 minutes of computerized orienta- 
tion about their status in the upcoming group task, students were given 
the Raven Progressive Matrices test. Upon completing the test, they were 
debriefed and paid. 
Data Collection 
During the computerized orientation, students answered several questions 
to confirm their identity as left- or right-handers. Data for those few who 
identified themselves as ambidextrous were removed from the study be- 
cause assignment o the high- or low-status condition could not be deter- 
mined. Students also reported their age, gender, high school grade point 
average (GPA), and score on the ACT test required for admission to the 
university. Other control variables of possible interest included father's 
and mother's levels of education and the estimated number of books in 
their home when they were 10 years old. During a post-test debriefing, 
students were questioned to determine whether they held expectations for 
their performance in group work that conformed to their assigned status. 
STUDY 1 
Altogether, 47 students (23 men and 24 women) took part in the first exper- 
iment. Participants were recruited from large survey courses at the Uni- 
versity of Iowa. Data were not analyzed for three students because they 
reported that their suspicions regarding the status assignment caused 




ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE, STUDY 1 
Effects F P 
Status . ......................................................... 5 23 .028 
Gender .67 .417 
ACT .5.97 .019 
GPA .02 .895 
Status X gender ....................... ....... 3.29 .077 
N = 44 men and women. 
11 men and 11 women in each status condition. Except for two students 
of Asian descent, all were European-American.9 
The mean Raven score for students in the high-status condition was 
55.63 (SD = 3.03), significantly higher than the mean Raven score for low- 
status students (53.91; SD = 3.60; t[42] = 1.72; P = .046, one-tailed).10 A
difference between conditions also appeared on one control variable. Low- 
status students reported a higher GPA in high school than did high-status 
subjects. Thus, overall means on the Raven test may understate the effect 
of status assignment. 
Table 1 shows the results of analysis of covariance to estimate the effect 
of status assignment on the Raven score while controlling for students' 
ACT score, GPA, and gender. Note that the status effect remains (F = 
5.23; P = .028). Score on a previous ability test also has an independent 
effect (F = 5.97; P = .019). Note also the marginal interaction between 
status and gender (F = 3.29; P = .077). We looked at the mean Raven 
scores of men and women separately to determine the nature of the inter- 
action. Women, it appeared, were not affected by status assignment in 
the same way as were men. The mean Raven score for women was essen- 
tially the same in high-status (M = 54.18; SD = 3.49) and low-status 
(M = 53.82; SD = 2.52) conditions. 
DISCUSSION 
The discovery of gender differences concerned us because gender itself is 
a status characteristic (Pugh and Wahrman 1983; Johnson, Clay-Warner, 
9 Although the lack of African-Americans avoids a possible confounding of race and 
status, we did not plan it. There were few African-American students in the subject 
pool and none volunteered for this study. 
10 Results from a nonparametric test, the Mann-Whitney U, are similar (Z = 1.92; 
P = .028, one-tailed). 
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and Funk 1996). Most standard tests of intelligence are constructed to 
equalize scores of males and females. We did not expect any difference 
in scores between males and females on the Raven test. However, in study 
1, high-status women scored about the same as did low-status men. The 
theoretical implications are interesting. If status has an effect on ability 
test scores, and gender is a status characteristic, then women should score 
lower than men on ability tests. If status differences do constrain ability 
test scores, then why do women not score lower than men on most mental 
ability tests? 
To speculate about the effect of status processes on ability test scores 
for status groups in society, it is necessary to estimate how each group 
conforms to the conditions of the theory. Gender and race are status char- 
acteristics but much else as well. They are fundamental social categories 
in society. For example, we have shown that African-Americans conform 
well to the model. African-Americans are expected to be less competent 
than European-Americans on a variety of tasks and can expect lower re- 
wards for the same level of ability. Perhaps most important, African- 
Americans face penalties, sometimes severe, for high scores on ability 
tests. Women are in a different situation. They may be expected to be 
less competent than men, and they can expect lower rewards. Women, 
however, do not face the penalties for high test scores that African-Ameri- 
cans do. Social conventions may require women to conceal their intelli- 
gence in certain situations, but a high-ability test score will not be penal- 
ized. The accepted path to success for women lies in doing well in school, 
getting high scores on tests, and going to an elite university to meet the 
right people. Women do not experience greatly increased costs relative to 
men until they enter the workforce full time, get married, and have chil- 
dren. Then the ambivalence toward personal achievement ypical of Afri- 
can-Americans becomes apparent in women as well (Simon 1995). An ex- 
ample of the lower productivity of women compared to men can be seen 
in the lower publication rates for female scientists even though female 
scientists have IQs at least as high as male scientists (Cole 1987). Because 
women do not experience the same penalties for a high score on an ability 
test that African-Americans do, they are not likely to feel the profound 
ambivalence to a high score that the theory predicts for African-Ameri- 
cans. 
Because Raven scores for women are not in general different from those 
of men we must examine the experimental situation for the cause of the 
emerging gender differences in study 1. We do so in study 3 when we 
investigate status differences in all-female work groups. First, however, 





RAVEN SCORE REGRESSIONS, STUDY 2 
Variable b SE b P 
Status ......... ........ 2.04 .99 .047 
ACT ......... ......... .32 .16 .059 
GPA ......... ......... .11 .40 .785 
N = 40 men. 
STUDY 2 
To avoid confounding ender with assigned status, we continued study 
1 with only men to try to confirm the original result. Altogether, 43 men 
participated in the study. Data were discarded for three men, including 
two who identified themselves as ambidextrous and one who was suspi- 
cious of the status assignment and said he did not try hard on the ability 
test. Data for 40 men remain to be analyzed, 20 in each status condition. 
All men added to the study were European-American. 
Male students assigned to the high-status condition scored significantly 
higher on the Raven test (M = 56.20; SD = 2.88) than did male students 
assigned low status (M =54.00; SD = 3.58; t[38] = 2.14; P = .020, one- 
tailed)."1 No difference was found between status conditions on any con- 
trol variable. We used multiple regression analysis to estimate the size of 
the effect of status assignment on Raven Score while controlling for stu- 
dents' high school GPA and ACT score. Table 2 shows that, controlling 
for these other measures of mental ability, the effect of status assignment 
on the Raven score remains about as large as the difference in overall 
means, that is, 2.04 points. Having established a significant difference in 
raw Raven scores between status groups, we transformed Raven scores 
into IQ scores (M = 100, SD = 15) for illustrative purposes only, to give 
a feel for the magnitude of the effect. Mean IQ for students assigned to 
" Results from a nonparametric test, the Mann-Whitney U, are similar (Z = 2.37; 
P = .009, one-tailed). Data are censored at the high end of the scale for the Raven 
test. Because the test is designed for the general population, scores in our college 
student sample are quite high. The mean score for the high-status group is over 56. 
A perfect score is 60. Students who score a perfect 60 may have been able to score 
higher had the test allowed them. A possible result would be the underestimation f
the difference between high- and low-status groups. However, the upper limit to Ra- 
ven scores had little effect in this study. Only one subject in the high-status group 
and one in the low-status group scored a perfect 60 on the test. 
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the high-status condition was 120, while mean IQ of students assigned 
low status was 112, an eight-point difference in IQ (Raven 1990). 
We conclude that randomly assigning male students to a high- or low- 
status position altered their scores on the Raven Progressive Matrices test. 
In study 1, however, no effect of the status assignment was found for 
female students. 
STUDY 3 
We altered the experimental setting to account for the status of women 
in society. The design of study 1 may have inadvertently imposed added 
costs on women in the high-status condition. Gender is a status character- 
istic. Women are expected to be less competent han men at a wide variety 
of tasks. But if women are low in status compared to men, the prospect 
of a leadership position in a mixed-sex work group would likely engender 
the same ambivalence in women as it would in individuals assigned low 
status. The gender composition of work groups was not specified in study 
1. However, it is likely that many participants assumed work groups 
would be composed of both men and women. If so, Raven scores of female 
participants in study 1 might have been depressed in the high-status con- 
dition. Women may have expected higher costs to accompany a supervi- 
sory position than did men. That is, women in the high-status condition 
facing the prospect of being appointed supervisor may have expected the 
same kinds of harassment in the work group as low-status supervisors. 12 
If high-status women scored lower on the Raven test because their sta- 
tus as women would place them in an uncomfortable position as supervi- 
sor of a mixed-sex work group, then the solution is straightforward. For 
study 3, we changed the computerized instructions to make clear that 
women would work in groups composed only of women. To lessen male 
orientation in the group task, we changed the work group scenario from 
a business setting to a mental health treatment setting. The three levels 
of occupational status in work teams were changed: Psychotherapists 
were to be paid $17.00 per hour; technicians, $8.00; and orderlies, $4.50. 
We also added another cost to low-status tudents who scored high on 
the aptitude test. We informed students that low-status individuals with 
high scores on the test would be given the chance to become psychothera- 
pists if they wrote and delivered a short speech to a professor and several 
graduate students. This increased the cost of a high test score for low- 
status students because many people fear public speaking. We also felt it 
would increase the involvement of low-status students, giving them a 




RAVEN SCORE REGRESSIONS, STUDY 3 
Variable b SE b P 
Status ......... ........ 2.31 .92 .017 
ACT ......... ......... .31 .15 .052 
GPA ......... ......... .33 .40 .412 
N = 40 women. 
chance to become supervisor. However, we hypothesized that despite any 
increased involvement, low-status tudents would still score lower on the 
mental ability test than would high-status tudents. 
There were 44 women students in the study. Data for four students were 
discarded: one because she identified herself as ambidextrous, another had 
missing data, and two suspected the status assignment and said they did 
not try hard on the test. One woman, assigned to the high-status condition, 
said she was so upset at the unjust treatment of low-status students that 
she could not concentrate on the test. We included her results in the analy- 
sis, somewhat depressing the mean Raven score for high-status tudents. 
We analyzed data for 40 women, 20 in each status condition. Except for 
one Hispanic student assigned to the high-status condition, all were Euro- 
pean-American.13 
The results for women in study 3 replicate closely results for men in 
study 2. Women assigned high status scored significantly higher on the 
Raven test (M = 54.95; SD = 2.93) than did women assigned low status 
(M = 52.35; SD = 3.39; t[38] = 2.59; P = .007).14 We found no significant 
differences between women assigned high and low status on any of the 
control variables. 
Table 3 gives results of the multiple regression analysis controlling for 
high school GPA and ACT score. Note that with these other indicators 
of mental ability controlled, the effect of status assignment remains about 
the same as the difference in the overall means, that is, 2.31 points. The 
size of the effect for women in study 3 was close to that for men in study 
2, both in terms of raw Raven score and transformed IQ score. We con- 
clude that the status assignment had similar effects on male and female 
students. Status processes produced a significant difference in ability test 
13 As in study 1, although the lack of African-Americans avoids a possible confounding 
of race and status, we did not plan it (see n. 9 above). 
" Results from a nonparametric test, the Mann-Whitney U, are similar (Z = 2.40; 
P = .008, one-tailed). 
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score between participants assigned to high- and low-status conditions of 
about half a standard deviation in magnitude. 
DISCUSSION 
We developed a theory to explain why socially advantaged individuals 
score higher on ability tests than do disadvantaged individuals even 
though both take the test under identical conditions. We began with status 
characteristics theory and its propositions linking membership in socially 
advantaged or disadvantaged groups to inequalities in performance val- 
uations and rewards. In the theory, status characteristics that signal mem- 
bership in advantaged or disadvantaged groups trigger expectations for 
ability that then produce observable differences in individual behavior. 
However, status characteristics theory had not been applied to individual 
performance on ability tests because the test situation seems to lack the 
collective social interaction ecessary for status processes to occur. 
Cohen's work using status processes to improve the academic perfor- 
mance of schoolchildren (Cohen et al. 1989) as well as Whyte's (1981) 
classic ethnographic account of status processes in a gang suggest that 
status processes do affect individual performances. We proposed an exten- 
sion of the scope of status characteristics theory to include situations 
where individual performances have consequences for future interaction 
in work groups. These consequences of individual performances are what 
bring status processes to bear on those performances. For example, a high 
score on an ability test leads to higher expectations of ability. In status 
characteristics theory, status rank is a direct function of expectations of 
ability. Thus, high score on an ability test represents a bid for increased 
status. However, bids for increased status by low-status individuals may 
be seen as illegitimate and sanctioned. We proposed that if low-status 
individuals are penalized for high scores on an ability test, then it is in 
their interest o score lower. We predicted that the status-disadvantaged 
who expect low rewards and high costs to result from a high score on an 
ability test would score lower on the test than the status-advantaged. 
Results of three experiments supported the hypothesis that participants 
randomly assigned low status would score lower on an ability test than 
would participants assigned high status. We used an accepted test of men- 
tal ability, Raven's Progressive Matrices. In study 1, men assigned low 
status had significantly lower Raven scores than did men assigned high 
status. However, no effect was found for women. In study 2, we increased 
the number of men who participated in the study to 40 to confirm that 
the effect found in study 1 was reliable. Study 2 found that men assigned 
high status scored about half a standard deviation higher on the Raven 
Progressive Matrices than did men assigned to low status. Thus, the mag- 
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nitude of the effect, while substantial, is below that found between Afri- 
can-Americans and European-Americans on such tests-about three- 
quarters of a standard deviation (Jensen 1980). However, the status effect 
found in study 2 resulted from about 15 minutes of instructions to partici- 
pants that created mild differences in status and relatively small differ- 
ences in rewards and costs. 
Study 3 investigated why women responded differently than men to 
the conditions in study 1. We theorized that women may have been sub- 
jected to additional costs for a high score on a test. Women may have 
expected a high test score to result in leadership of a mixed-sex work 
group. Because of the status differences between men and women, women 
may have expected difficulties supervising men similar to the difficulties 
expected by participants assigned to the low-status condition. Thus, study 
1 confounded gender with low status, explaining the result that high-sta- 
tus women scored about the same as participants assigned low status. In 
study 3, to resolve the problem, women expected to participate in work 
groups composed only of women. If the status of women were responsible 
for the lack of a result in study 1, then assigning women to work in same- 
sex work groups should solve the problem. In study 3, as predicted, 
women assigned to high status scored higher on the Raven Progressive 
Matrices than did women assigned to low status. The magnitude of the 
effect was comparable to that found for men in study 2, about half a 
standard deviation. While we did not anticipate the additional constraints 
on test scores for women produced by experimental conditions in study 
1, resolution of the problem in study 3 provides independent confirmation 
of the effect of status processes on ability test scores. 
Our studies raise several questions for future research. In our experi- 
ments, we looked for an effect of an entire status process. That is, a status 
process that includes both status differences and the differences in re- 
wards and costs that result. Differences in status alone, independent of 
subsequent rewards and costs, may have a small effect on ability test 
scores. The effect would be similar to that of self-efficacy. There is some 
evidence that self-efficacy has a small effect on standardized test scores 
(Multon et al. 1991). It would be interesting to see if such an effect can 
reliably be produced in the laboratory by altering expectations that partic- 
ipants have for their ability. Also, penalties for a high score on an ability 
test may be the major factor in the low test scores we found for low-status 
individuals. Gender is a status characteristic, and women cannot expect 
rewards as high as men for a high score on an ability test, yet ability test 
scores for men and women are equal. Women, however, do not face any 
obvious additional penalties of a high score on an ability test. In contrast, 
African-Americans, who face a variety of additional costs for success, 
have substantially lower ability test scores. Thus, it may be the additional 
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penalties rather than lower expected rewards that produce most of the 
difference in test scores. Future experiments could systematically vary re- 
wards and costs expected by participants to result from high-ability test 
scores. 
Assessing the implications of our results requires care. We have discov- 
ered evidence that status processes-and the differential rewards and 
costs they generate-cause differences in ability test scores in the labora- 
tory. Such evidence does not generalize directly to differences in tests 
scores for status advantaged and disadvantaged groups in society. Rather, 
we have extended a well-developed and rigorously tested theory of status 
processes, then tested our extension. Because our experimental evidence 
supports the theory, we gain confidence that the theory can be applied 
wherever status-advantaged and -disadvantaged groups experience con- 
ditions required by the theory. To predict that members of a status-disad- 
vantaged group will score lower on an ability test, the theory requires 
that (1) disadvantaged individuals are expected to have lower ability than 
advantaged individuals, (2) test scores have consequences for future work 
in groups, and (3) disadvantaged individuals expect a high test score to 
result in lower rewards and higher costs than do advantaged individuals. 
Given the theoretical requirements for predicting which groups will 
score lower on ability tests, we can then use additional sources of evidence 
to determine how closely a particular group corresponds to the require- 
ments of the theory. If the group faces conditions hown by the theory to 
produce differences in ability test scores, then we have reason to suspect 
that differences found for that group result from status processes. There 
is substantial evidence that African-Americans face conditions required 
by the theory to produce differences in ability test scores. First, African- 
Americans are expected to be less able on a variety of tasks requiring 
mental ability. That is, race is a status characteristic (Cohen and Roper 
1972; Webster and Driskell 1978). The lower academic performance of 
African-Americans is widely known. Second, ability test scores determine 
who is admitted to elite institutions of higher education and who is given 
opportunities for high-status occupations. Thus, ability test scores have 
status consequences for future work in groups. Third, there is evidence 
that African-Americans can expect to be criticized for higher-than-ex- 
pected test scores (Rubovits and Maehr 1973). In addition, African-Ameri- 
cans expect lower rewards and actual penalties to result from higher edu- 
cation. In a study of high school students, Mickelson (1990) found that, 
while African-Americans embraced the abstract value of education even 
more strongly than European-Americans, African-Americans were more 
pessimistic than European-Americans about the concrete rewards that 
would result. African-Americans can expect higher costs to result from 
academic achievement as well. Steele (1992) describes the high personal 
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and emotional costs involved when African-Americans attempt to com- 
plete a college degree, as well as the lack of expectations that a degree 
will offer any meaningful improvement in their lives. Because ability tests 
are strongly related to education, African-Americans may have similar 
expectations for ability tests. While more systematic evidence is needed of 
penalties imposed on African-Americans for high test scores, substantial 
evidence exists that African-Americans face the conditions required by 
the theory. If African-Americans do face theoretically required conditions, 
then we have reason to suspect that status processes lower their scores 
on ability tests. 
CONCLUSION 
We have shown how status processes, by altering expected rewards and 
costs, can affect scores on a standard test of mental ability. In three experi- 
ments, participants were given approximately 15 minutes of computerized 
instruction to create status differences and attendant expectations for re- 
wards and costs. Participants in high-status and low-status conditions re- 
ceived exactly the same instructions. In all studies, the brief and relatively 
mild intervention produced differences in scores on a standard test of men- 
tal ability approximately half of a standard deviation in magnitude. Stu- 
dents randomly assigned to a high-status position scored higher on the 
Raven Progressive Matrices test than those assigned low status. The status 
effect remained after individual differences in mental ability were statisti- 
cally controlled. Further research is needed to ascertain the effects of the 
more severe and long-term status processes that operate in society at large. 
Our results do suggest the necessity to account for status differences- 
and the expectations for rewards and costs that they produce-in any 
attempt to measure mental ability accurately. 
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